Verification techniques have become popular in software and hardware development. They increase confidence and potentially provide rich feedback. However, with increasing complexity verification techniques are more likely to contain errors themselves. Many verification tools use invariants of the considered systems for their analysis. These invariants are often generated by the verification tools in a first step. The correctness of these invariants is crucial for the analysis results.
Introduction
Verification tools to ensure properties of complex systems have become popular in many application areas. One major goal is to guarantee safety and security properties of the considered systems. These can be computed by generating invariants of the considered systems in a first step and analyzing them. However, as verification tools become more and more complex it is not always easy to see if they are themselves working correctly. An incorrect verification tool might state a wrong property about a system.
Guided by a case study of automatically verifying invariants of given systems (BIP models) within a theorem prover, we introduce a notion of robustness for these systems. The invariants that are subject to this paper are computed and used by the D-Finder [BBNS08] tool that decides deadlock-freedom of systems modeled in the BIP language [BBS06] . The BIP language is designed for building realtime embedded systems consisting of heterogeneous components. Invariants that are both inductive and capture the behavior of systems in an adequate way are highly desirable for analysis and verification tools.
In our case study, we require invariants to be inductive to be verified automatically and motivate techniques that are likely to produce inductive invariants. We establish a notion of robust BIP models. These take imprecision of values due to physical measurements into account. Invariants of robust systems are aimed at describing a system's behavior in an adequate way while preserving the necessary precision to be used as basis for analysis results. We present a mapping from non-robust to robust systems and prove that invariants of robust systems are also invariants of the original non-robust systems. This allows us to reuse invariant based analysis results for these systems. 
Our Casy Study: Guaranteeing Correctness of the Results of A Verification Tool
Robust BIP models are used to make the process (called certification) of automatically proving the results of a deadlock-detection verification tool easier thereby guaranteeing the correctness of its verdict. The overall approach of this tool and the verification process guaranteeing that its results are correct is described in the following two paragraphs.
The Deadlock-detection Tool D-Finder and the Certification of its Results
The deadlock-detection tool D-Finder takes BIP models as inputs and decides whether they are deadlock free. In order to do this, in a first step invariants of these are computed. This is the most sophisticated step within D-Finder. In addition to D-Finder's algorithms an external tool: Omega [Ome00] is used in the invariant generation process to perform quantifier elimination. In a second step these invariants are checked to be deadlock-free by using the external SMT solver Yices [DM06] and a definition of deadlock-states.
Verifying that invariants hold is used for guaranteeing the absence of deadlocks in our guiding case study [BP08, BP08a] . The methodology underlying this case study is depicted in Figure 1 . BIP models are passed to D-Finder, the deadlock-detection tool. In this paper, we do not trust D-Finder in a first place, but want to establish proofs, that it has indeed worked correctly for each run of this tool. Apart from detecting deadlocks, a certificate is generated by a some part of the tool (denoted CertGen). This certificate comprises a proof of deadlock-freedom and is passed to a theorem prover. The D-Finder tool computes invariants and uses them to decide whether a system is deadlock free or not. Most important to this paper is the fact, that the certificates contain these invariants and a proof script that is generated by the certificate generator proving that the invariants do indeed hold. The theorem prover uses this proof script to prove that a BIP model is indeed deadlock-free.
Proving Deadlock-freedom
To verify that a system is indeed deadlock-free in the theorem prover, we have to check the certificates. We break this task of verifying deadlock-freedom for a given BIP model BM down into different subtasks as shown in Figure 2 . The proofs for these subtasks are composed to prove the top line. In the figure, we use the following definition of enabled states capturing BIP states from which a state transition to a succeeding state is possible: 
It is inductively defined demanding that the initial state is reachable and each state that can be reached from it via transitive state transitions. The task of verifying deadlock-freedom is performed by using the refinement shown in Figure 2: 1. The top line in the figure shows our notion of deadlock-freedom for a BIP model. 
does hold is a challenging tasks of our methodology. It captures the correctness of the main task of the D-Finder tool: finding invariants. The work presented in the rest of this paper concentrates on generating realistic invariants, reports on experiences with case studies and suggests ways to improve the computation of the invariant thereby making the verification task easier.
Overview
We introduce the BIP semantics for modeling our systems in Section 2 and present a small example. A discussion of invariants of BIP models and their properties is given in Section 3. Section 4 introduces robust BIP models and a motivation for and proofs of their properties. The benefits of robust BIP models in verifying invariants for our example application scenario is presented in Section 5. Related Work is discussed in Section 6 .In Section 7 we draw a conclusion and present ideas for future work.
BIP Models and Their Semantics
In this section we describe the semantics of BIP models. BIP is a software framework designed for building embedded systems consisting of heterogeneous components. It is characterized by three modeling layers: behavior of components encoded as transition systems extended with variables, interactions between components realized via communication ports and priority rules which reduce non-determinism between interactions (BIP stands for Behaviors + Interactions + Priorities). Apart from code generation the BIP tool chain comprises static analyses tools for checking properties like deadlock-freedom.
BIP models are composed of atomic components [BBS06] [BBNS08] that can be composed into larger components. Components are state transition systems. They communicate via ports with each other. 
• V i is a set of variables,
• P i is a set of ports, The guard functions are predicates and are formulated on the variables appearing in an atomic component. The following definition describes a language for these predicates: Definition 2.2 (Guard language). A predicate φ belongs to the guard language iff it is constructed using the following rules:
φ ::= φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | ¬φ | e e ::= e < e | e ≤ e | e = e | e = e | e ≥ e | e > e e := op | e + e | e − e | val · e op ::= var | val Assuming the guard function appears in the ith component, the var ∈ V i are variables appearing in it. val ∈ D i denotes some numerical type. The variables var ∈ V i are mapped to the same type. Typical types are reals and integers.
The semantic interpretation of the guard language follows the rules of predicate logic and arithmetics. Note, that the expressability of the guard language corresponds to Presburger arithmetics' when D i denotes integer values. The atomic components of a BIP model are connected via ports. They communicate via interactions. Thus, a composed component is defined as a tuple ((B 1 , ..., B n ), Interactions) comprising the atomic components and their interactions. An interaction is a tuple (p 1 , . . . , p n ) where p i is a port of the atomic component B i or ⊥ if B i is not involved in this interaction. The state of an atomic component B i is a tuple (l i , x i ) comprising a location and variables' valuations. The state of a BIP model is the product of the state of its atomic components:
A transition relation for BIP models is defined via the following predicate.
Definition 2.3 (Transition Relation).
A transition relation for a BIP model BM (denoted BM BIP ) for BIP models is defined via the following rule:
A state transition from a given reachable state is possible if there is an interaction such that there is in each component either a possible state transition labeled with the port or the component is not involved in the interaction. Furthermore, in order to do a transition of an atomic component the appropriate guard functions must evaluate to true. To derive the succeeding states the update functions are performed on the valuation functions of the involved atomic components. Using the transition relation, reachable states of a BIP model are defined in the following definition. 
is defined via the following inductive rules:
The first rule says that the initial state is reachable. The second inference rule captures the transition behavior of BIP using the transition relation. Figure 3 shows a temperature control system [BBNS08, ACH+95] modeled in BIP. It controls the cooling of a reactor by moving two independent control rods. The goal is to keep the temperature between θ = 100 and θ = 1000. When the temperature reaches the maximum value one of the rods has to be used for cooling. The BIP model comprises three atomic components one for each rod and one for the controller. Each contains a state transition system. Transitions can be labeled with guard conditions, valuation function updates, and a port. The components interact via ports thereby realizing cooling, heating, and time elapsing interactions. 
An Example

Invariants of BIP Models
In this section we discuss invariants for BIP models and motivate desired properties.
Definition 3.1 (Invariant). A predicate I over the states of a BIP model BM is an invariant of BM iff ∀s.ReachableStates BM (s) −→ I(s)
The invariant Ψ BM is composed of component invariants (CI) and interaction invariants (II):
The following invariants are computed by D-Finder to approximate the behavior of the components (component invariants) in the example from Figure 3:
at i is a predicate denoting the fact that we are at location i in a component. In addition to component invariants D-Finder computes interaction invariants capturing the behavior induced by interactions between the atomic components. In addition to component invariants D-Finder generates interaction invariants which capture the behavior of components interacting with each other. An example for an interaction invariant for the given BIP model is shown below: By using the definition of reachable states we can prove the following theorem which is independent of concrete BIP models:
Theorem 3.1. Every inductive invariant of a BIP model BM is also an invariant of BM.
Both CI 1 and CI 2 are inductive. CI 3 is not inductive because it evaluates to true for a state where we are at control location l6 (at l6 ) and θ = 101. But, it does not hold for the succeeding state at l6 and θ = 99. Note, that since a state where at l6 and θ = 101 is never reached within a real system run, CI 3 is still an invariant.
For verifying invariants during certificate checking we perform an induction on the set of reachable states. For this reason, it is highly desirable if invariants are inductive.
Making Invariants Inductive by Strengthening We can make invariants inductive by strengthening them. Given an invariant I we can add some strengthening constraints C to create a stronger invariant I . The proof that I implies that I holds for a given state s is a trivial application of the conjunction elimination rule:
For example CI 3 can be made inductive by adding a constraint that at location l6, θ is always divisible by two (2|θ ). We can now verify the inductive invariant and show that it implies the weaker non-inductive one. Thus, the non-inductive one, is proven to be an invariant, too.
We have experimented with techniques to strengthen invariants automatically. In many cases it is possible to "guess" the C constraints that make invariants inductive. The additional constraint could be constructed following the general method presented in [BM08] that refines the invariant to reach an inductive one.
However, sometimes strengthening invariants seems artificial. Adding the divisibility constraint mentioned above to a variable that represents a physical measure could also indicate some design flaw of the original system. We should not base the verification of a system on the fact that the temperature measured by some sensors is an even number.
So, instead of strengthening the constraints on physical measures, we introduce in this paper a way to model the uncertainty of measurement. We concentrate on finding slightly weaker invariants of systems that represent the nature of variables depending on physical measurements in a more natural way.
For each invariant there is always a weaker invariant that is inductive: I ≡ true is the weakest invariant for all BIP models and is inductive.
Robust BIP Models
In this section we introduce robust BIP models. Robust BIP models and their invariants are aimed at describing systems in a more natural way. Specifically, the target of our approach are systems whose values represent physical measurements. These are performed by sensors, which are usually not exact but have some tolerance range of imprecision associated with them. The measured value can vary within this range differing from the actual value. To capture the behavior in BIP models that are based on this unprecise information, we introduce special sets of measurement variables. Guard functions depending on an exact measurement variable in a BIP model are changed in a way that they evaluate to true -i.e. may perform a transition -within a range of unpreciseness to achieve robust BIP models.
Robust BIP models are realized by exchanging guards by robust guards described by a robust guard language:
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val denotes some numerical type var like reals or integers.
Each reference to a measurement variable within a robust guard function is accompanied by some unknown constant δ m which captures its imprecision. Compared to the original guard language, the interpretation of the δ m in the robust guard language requires some non-trivial definitions.
The semantical interpretation of guard functions is adapted in a way that a robust system is an abstraction of a non-robust system. This means that due to non-determinism it allows more possibilities of transition but preserves the transition possibilities of the non-robust system. Given a set of measurement variables V R , for each m ∈ V R there is some unknown δ m within some fixed range −∆ m ≤ δ m ≤ ∆ m (∆ m ≥ 0). This range captures the level of imprecision which a value that represents a physical measurement can have.
A robust guard is constructed from a non-robust guard in two steps:
• In the first step, negations are eliminated by putting them to the lowest level thereby changing (in)equalities by a function ... 1 . This function is defined inductively on the term structure of the guards and performs e.g. the following transformations:
Thus, it eliminates all cases of ¬φ .
• The second step introduces the δ m for the measurement variables and is performed by a function ... 2 which is shown in Figure 4 .
Consider as an example the guard ¬θ = 1000. It is transformed into ¬θ = 1000 1 2 = θ = 1000 2 = θ + δ θ = 1000 for a measurement variable θ . The semantic interpretation of such a guard φ is done in the following way for measurement variables m 1 ...m n :
Thus, in the above example, we have ∃δ θ .θ + δ θ = 1000 with −∆ θ ≤ δ θ ≤ ∆ θ .
The existential quantification of the δ m ensures that the robust guard function over approximates the corresponding non-robust guard function. We need the first transformation step eliminating the negations, because our methodology only works, if we eliminate all negations: an existential quantification over a negated δ m would result in an under approximation.
Note, that robust guards can be transformed back into the non-robust guard language while preserving their semantics. θ + δ θ = 1000 can be equivalently written as 1000 − ∆ θ > θ ∨ 1000 + ∆ θ < θ by only using the constant ∆ θ . For practical applications, the computations performed in D-Finder can be done, using either the robust guards having been translated back into the non-robust guard language, or with slight modifications in D-Finder, by using the robust guard language directly.
A non-robust guard function can be constructed from a robust guard function by setting each δ m to zero.
Definition 4.2 (Robust BIP Models).
A BIP model is considered robust for a set of variables V R iff all guard functions depending on a variable m ∈ V R are formalized in the robust guard language.
Each guard can be substituted by a robust guard by replacing each occurrence of m ∈ V R by m + δ m in a guard as shown above. We define a function Robust V R for a set of measurement variables V R to map BIP models to robust BIP models by replacing the guard functions by robust ones. 
Proof:
We have to show that the robust guard functions allow at least all state transitions that the non-robust guard functions allow. We do an induction on the term structure of φ to show:
... 1 2 evaluates at least in all cases to true where δ m 1 ...δ m n fixed to 0 would evaluate to true.
An example robust BIP model constructed from our temperature controller example (cp. Figure 3 ) for a measurement variable θ is shown in Figure 5 . ∀s ∈ ReachableStates BM ∆ .I(s) (since I is an invariant of BM ∆ ) and ReachableStates BM ⊆ ReachableStates BM ∆ (reachable states inclusion) implies ∀s ∈ ReachableStates BM .I(s) 2
Application of Robust BIP Models
In this section we discuss the deadlock checking of robust BIP models with D-Finder and summarize and extend our comparison of invariants used in the process of certifying the deadlock freedom of a BIP model for usage with a higher-order theorem prover after D-Finder has provided its verdict. Figure 5: Robust Temperature Control System with measurement variable θ
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ReachableStates BM ∆ ind. proo f (new proo f strategy) Invariants of Robust and Non-robust BIP models and D-Finder The relations between different invariants of BIP models BM and its robust counter-part BM ∆ is shown in Figure 6 Starting from the weakest inductive invariant (true), DFinder computes a sequence of stronger invariants using the initial conditions and the provided BIP model BM. Due to abstractions performed by DFinder this process can provide an invariant Ψ BM that is not inductive. Using non-robust BIP models in our certification process the proof of the (dashed) implication can not be established for non-inductive invariants and the certificate generation fails. The critical abstraction used in DFinder is in elimination of existential quantifiers in the logical formula that defines the successors of a state which becomes part of the provided invariant. DFinder uses the Omega library for that step [Ome00] . A closer look at the original formula and its abstraction reveals the constraints that were lost during abstraction. The loss of precision is due to the fact that (1) some facts are implicit (e.g., for a variable x, the fact x ≥ 0 is eliminated if x is of type nat), or (2) facts cannot be represented in the logic (this is the case of divisibility constraints in the Omega library). The addition of these lost constraints leads to an inductive invariant. The divisibility constraints can be useful for variables of the program that range over discrete domains (e.g., counters). However it produces inductive but unrealistic invariants for variables that represent physical measurements provided by sensors. Furthermore, Figure 6 shows the goals sketched in the introduction and in Section 3 on invariants. In order to conduct the proof we seek for an inductive invariant Ψ Inductive that contains the (non-computable) sets of reachable states and that entails the deadlock-freedom property (Enabled BM ), such that the following implications holds:
To build Ψ Inductive we can try to strengthen the invariant provided by DFinder by guessing a suitable constraint such that Ψ BM ∧ Guess is inductive. The certificate then encapsulates the proof of the rightmost chain of implications. Otherwise we can try the approach promoted in this paper for building an inductive invariant weaker than Ψ BM but still strong enough to entail the deadlock-freedom. This approach comprises the Ψ BM ∆ invariant of the robust BIP model and corresponds to the left-most chain of implications of Figure 6 .
Each approach can lead to a certificate based on a proof by induction which can be automatically generated and then provided to a higher-order theorem prover for checking.
Evaluation In contrast to non-robust BIP models, D-Finder produces inductive invariants of robust BIP models in the case studies that we examined so far. The model of Figure 5 is the robust version of our running example of Figure [?] . In all guards the uncertainity δ is added to the θ variable that corresponds to the measure of the temperature. This transformation prevents the generation of over constrained invariants. Obviously, the generated invariants are less precise than those obtained for the original model. Hopefully, in our experimentations this did not introduce new deadlock possibilities. Actually, it is highly desireable that the deadlock-freedom property of a system be not dependant to the sensitivity of sensors. The CI 3 invariant relates the value of θ to the location of the controller state machine. The original invariant is not inductive. It can be either strengthened by adding the additional constraint, 2|θ , then leading to an inductive but unrealistic invariant. A more realistic invariant is obtained by running DFinder on the robust model. The resulting invariant is inductive and strong enough to conduct the last step of the deadlock analysis. The final result are as precise as the ones obtained with the two other invariants; no false deadlocks are generated by robust invariants.
Not all invariants of robust BIP models have to be necessarily inductive. It may be possible that we need to strengthen them sometimes e.g. by using the technique discussed in [BM08] . These techniques, however, must not add constraints bearing unnatural facts on the measuring process of the measurement variables. 
Related Work
This paper describes the modification of systems in order to generate realistic inductive invariants for a verification tool. These invariants are verified to hold by a higher-order theorem prover for certifying the results of the verification tool. The inductiveness is most important for the certification process. To our knowledge this particular subject has not yet been studied before.
Certification The certification of analysis results is an important aspect of this work. We generate certificates in the form of proof-scripts for a higher-order theorem prover. The generation of proofs to certify the verdict of a model-checker was first introduced in [Nam01] . Other important work for certifying the results of verification tools comprise the use of support sets for a model checker [TC02] and keeping track of justifications for the BLAST model-checker [HJM+02] . Further related is ProofCarrying Code (PCC) [Nec97] , a method to guarantee that executable code fulfills a policy on access and resource management and Foundational PCC [WAS03] characterized by a small set of axioms and a simpler proof-checker . In this paper we concentrate on certifying invariants via a formal proof done by induction.
Generation of Inductive Invariants Automatic generation of invariants has been studied for a long time. For the invariants considered in this paper the papers [BLS96] and [SDB96] where most influential.
[BLS96] describes many principles that have been implemented in our deadlock-verification tool DFinder.
[BM08] focuses on techniques to incrementally generate inductive invariants. The main idea is to use counter-examples to refine an invariant until it becomes provable by induction. The paper features in addition to the description of general techniques, further valuable techniques to refine invariants by splitting large conjunctions into subparts and refine selected subparts independently. This method has been successfully used in the refinement of boolean invariants. The presented techniques require a deep knowledge of the class of systems in consideration, in order to cleverly take advantage of the presented counter-example guided refinement approach of invariants.
In this paper we regard strengthening of non-inductive invariants by taking advantage of our knowledge of the verification tools D-Finder -we know when the invariant can lose their inductiveness quality -as one possibility to achieve inductive invariants.
Robustness Another feature of this paper is robustness. Robustness of timed automata is described in [GHJ97] . This notion is similar to our notion and has been introduced for real-time systems in order to cope with properties that e.g. occur when transforming continuous signals to discrete values or problems due to imprecision of sensors. The theory of verification of systems is enriched with a so called tube-semantics to capture uncertainty. Similarly, [AM95] introduces the notion of finite variability for properties of continuous systems to capture semantics intervals of continuous time. The presented procurement allows proving properties of a continuous semantics by reasoning on a discrete semantics which is more appropriate for automated verification and deductive reasoning. A constrained solving based method for generating inductive invariants for hybrid systems is presented in [SSM04] .
In contrast to these work, we do not consider real-time system with continuous semantics. The BIP system has a discrete semantics and acquires information about the physical quantities through sensors. One of our our goals is introducing uncertainty about the sensors measurements while reusing DFinder invariant generation techniques based on a discrete semantics.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have introduced the notion of robust BIP models for systems containing values representing the results of physical measurements. Robust BIP models can be obtained from non-robust BIP models and over aproximate their behavior. We proved that each invariant of the robust BIP model is also an invariant of the corresponding non-robust BIP model. We motivated that invariants that have been automatically generated by the deadlock detection tool D-Finder for robust BIP models tend to be inductive while those of non-robust systems are likely to be non-inductive. Inductivity of invariants allows for easy formal verification that they do indeed hold in a higher-order theorem prover. Our technique is applied for certifying the results of D-Finder at runtime.
Future works involves the analysis of further case studies to discover more benefits and potential limitations of our approach. More technical challenges comprise the addition of dynamic ranges of unpreciseness. These can be modeled as functions depending on measured values and have to be integrated in our guard languages (e.g. for expressing a certain percentage of unpreciseness). This is difficult since our used SMT-solver Yices can only deal with invariants generated from guard functions formalized in Presburger arithmetics. Fixing invariants by adding constraints in order to make them inductive is also an area of future work. Such constraints might be generated by using hints from unresolved theorem prover goals created during the process of trying to prove an invariants correct.
